Eleven sandbox and agent-security products next to Semantic, read from their public docs. Their column on the left, ours on the right, every claim with a source.
| Self-hosted execution | Egress rules | Credentials kept out of sandbox | File, Git, SSH permissions | Tamper-evident agent log | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| E2B | yes | yes | yes | no | no |
| Daytona / Modal / Vercel Sandbox | partialBYOC | yes | partialVercel | no | partialplatform |
| Embedded sandboxes microsandbox / OpenSandbox | yes | yes | yes | no | no |
| AWS AgentCore | no | n/a | partialvault | limitedtool calls | partialCloudTrail |
| Aembit agent identity | n/a | n/a | partialshort-lived | limitedservices | partialaudit |
| >semantic | On-prem (enterprise) | yes | yes | yes | yes |
Public docs, Oct 2026. Daytona BYOC runs on your cloud with Daytona's control plane; Vercel brokers credentials; Daytona and AgentCore log platform activity, not actions inside the sandbox. Detail pages carry their own sources.
The microVM runs on machines you own, with no vendor control plane in the data path.
You decide which network destinations a sandbox can reach.
Tokens and keys never enter the agent's VM; a gateway uses them on its behalf.
Per-path, per-branch and per-host rules on what the agent may read, write or push.
Actions inside the sandbox, including denials; every refusal is recorded, smx agent logs shows it.
The capability exists with the caveat in brackets, for example only on a vendor's cloud or only for tool calls.